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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA JANE CHADWICK, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-vs-
TALMAGE NIELSEN, M. D., 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 20732 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
This is a medical malpractice action in which the trial 
court, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, directed a verdict for 
defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence in accordance with 
Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Whether the directed 
verdict was appropriate is now before this Court. That determination 
requires consideration of five issues: 
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1. Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case of 
medical negligence? 
2. Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case of lack 
of informed consent? 
3. Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case for 
recovery under any other theory of relief? 
4. Is plaintiff's action barred as a matter of law by 
the applicable statute of repose? 
5. Was there any other reversible error committed by 
the trial court? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
!• 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a medical malpractice action against a Salt 
Lake vascular surgeon, Dr. Talmage Nielsen. Dr. Nielsen performed 
varicose vein surgery on Rebecca Chadwick's left leg at L.D.S. 
Hospital in Salt Lake City on September 19, 1979. Ms. Chadwick 
alleges that the decision to perform the surgery was inappropriate, 
that she was not informed of the risks of the surgery, that she 
was assured of a good result from the surgery, that Dr. Nielsen's 
postoperative care was negligent and, finally, that Dr. Nielsen 
intentionally withheld the results of a preoperative vein test 
from her. (See, Complaint, R.2 and Amended Complaint, R.79.) As 
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a result of the surgery plaintiff alleges she suffered a four-year 
period of disability caused by swelling and pain in her left leg. 
(See, generally, Ms. Chadwick's trial testimony at R.467 to 
495.). 
The Complaint was filed on May 4, 1984. Partial summary 
judgment was entered on the "oral warranty" claims on September 
19, 1984. A non-jury trial solely on the issue of the statute of 
repose was held in accordance with § 78-12-47, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended)^/ on March 26, 1985, the court denying judgment 
for defendant on the grounds that the "continuing negligence" 
doctrine created a fact issue which might only be decided after a 
trial on the merits (The transcript of the limitations trial is 
at R.242-342; the court's decision is at R.97.) 
Plaintiff thereafter moved to amend her Complaint to 
allege an "intentional concealment" by Dr. Nielsen of the results 
of the preoperative vein test, to set aside the partial summary 
judgment, and to continue the trial date. (R.73-95). All of 
plaintiff's motions were heard and denied on the morning of the 
first day of the trial on the merits, April 16, 1985. (R.346-358). 
1/ All statutory citations are to the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). 
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At the close of plaintifffs evidence, the trial court 
granted Dr. Nielsen's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds 
that plaintiff had produced no expert testimony of negligence or 
causation and, thus, had failed to establish a prima facie case 
on any of her claims for relief. Additionally, the court ruled 
that the claims were barred by the applicable four-year statute 
of repose, § 78-14-4 (R.545-551, 234). This appeal followed. 
II. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
This appeal stems from an attempt to oversimplify 
complex issues of vascular surgery and to impose medical liability 
on a physician without the benefit of expert testimony. The 
apparent theory of plaintiff's case — unsupported by any medical 
evidence — was that the symptoms she claims to have developed 
postoperatively were due to Dr. Nielsen's removing a surface vein 
in her left leg when the only other source of circulation in that 
leg — the deep vein — wasn't working. (See, generally, Appellant's 
Brief at 1-5.) That allegation is premised upon two liability 
claims. First, that Dr. Nielsen ignored a preoperative test 
which showed that the deep system was inadequate and, thus, that 
the surgery was inappropriate; and, second, that Dr. Nielsen 
concealed this material information from plaintiff and, in fact, 
guaranteed that he would not perform this surgery unless the 
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condition of the deep venous system would allow it. Analysis of 
the medical issues shows these claims to be flawed. 
On September 19, 1979, Dr. Nielsen performed a left 
standard saphenous phlebectomy on plaintiff; that is, he removed 
one of the larger surface veins on the inside of her left leg 
from just below the knee to just above the ankle. The reason for 
performing the surgery was that the saphenous vein was incompetent, 
(having valves which were not working) and thus was unable to 
perform its function of transporting blood back to the heart. 
That incompetency can cause damage to the venous system because 
it results in a standing pool of blood under considerable hydrostatic 
tension in the vein. (See, generally, R.425 ff) That tension 
produces swelling and large, ugly varicose veins which result 
from the blood invading the surrounding tissue. (R.428) By 
removing the varicose vein, Dr. Nielsen was intending to prevent 
more serious difficulties such as ulcerations, pigmentation, 
brawny edema, or other problems due to the varicosity. (R.428-429) 
Without the benefit of any expert testimony, plaintiff 
relied upon her interpretation of two documents to support her 
claims: a September 14, 1979, report on a phleborheogram performed 
at Dr. Nielsen's request on plaintiff's legs and a letter of the 
same date from Dr. Nielsen to Dr. Jonathan Daines, plaintiff's 
referring physician and uncle. 
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The phleborheogram ("PRG") is a pulse-pressure test and 
a respiratory wave test. (R.396) A respiratory wave is created 
when we breathe and expand our chest wall causing a negative 
pressure that draws blood into the chest and then into the heart. 
(Id.) If veins are open, a respiratory wave will be transmitted 
all the way down the veins. (Id.) If a vein is not open, then 
the respiratory wave will not be transmitted. If a vein is not 
quite normal, then there will be a "dampening" of the respiratory 
wave. (Id.) 
The PRG is performed by a technician and produces both 
a study tracing and a report, much like an x-ray produces both a 
typed report and an actual film study. (R.374) Dr. Nielsen 
based his decisions concerning the treatment of plaintiff's 
condition not only upon the report, but also upon a discussion of 
the tracings with the technician. (R.374) The PRG report indicated 
an abnormality in the left leg: "Although there is reasonably 
good transmission of respiratory waves on the left, there is 
persistent elevation of the baseline waves with distal pressure, 
this suggests a chronic obstructive situation." (A copy of the 
PRG report is in Appellant's Brief at Appendix A-I.) 
An "obstruction" means any degree of interference with 
normal flow, however minimal. An "occlusion" means that the vein 
is shut off completely and that there are no detour channels. 
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(R.372-373) After reviewing the tracings and the report with the 
technician, Dr. Nielsen's medical opinion was that the PRG results 
were very encouraging and showed good respiratory wave transmission 
throughout the leg, with only minor interference with the flow in 
the deep system. (R.371-372) That minor interference was due to 
plaintiff's childhood knee surgery. (R.397) In Dr. Nielsen's 
opinion, plaintiff's surface vein problem could be corrected with 
standard varicose surgery without the necessity of a more extensive 
procedure. 
There is repetitive discussion of this point throughout 
Dr. Nielsen's testimony. (See, for example, R.367-375, 391-397) 
Plaintiff attempts to construe the PRG report as containing 
information which would contradict varicose vein surgery or 
increase the risk of complications from it. Neither of these 
assertions was supported by any medical evidence at trial and, in 
fact, both assertions were shown to be false by Dr. Nielsen's 
testimony. In essence, plaintiff's theory is that the inner vein 
was "unequivocally and abnormally obstructed" (R.370) based on 
the PRG report, although the PRG report says nothing of the sort, 
and, further, that an "obstruction" must mean a contraindication 
to the surgery. However, the only medical evidence is that 
plaintiff's obstruction was of a very minor nature and posed no 
contraindication or increased risk from the varicose vein surgery. 
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Plaintiff, in recognition of her lack of any expert testimony, 
attempts to avoid the necessity of producing a medical opinion by 
characterizing the PRG report as containing "material" information 
which was "concealed" from her, even though the only medical 
evidence was that the information was not "material" and was, in 
fact, encouraging. (R.367-365, 391-397) 
As an alternative position, plaintiff attempts to 
characterize Dr. Nielsen's preoperative letter to Dr. Jonathan 
Daines as a written guarantee that he would not perform varicose 
vein surgery unless the deep system was normal. (A copy of the 
letter is Appendix II to Appellant's Erief.) In this letter, Dr. 
Nielsen tells Dr. Daines of the results of his examination and 
indicates that a phleborheogram would be performed to be certain 
that there was no obstruction that would contraindicate the 
surgery: "However, to be certain that there is no obstruction, a 
phleborheogram will be obtained tomorrow. If this is normal, I 
would think that she can be given complete relief by just a 
standard saphenous phlebectomy on this side. That will be planned 
if the deep system is normal as anticipated." 
The uncontradicted testimony of the author of the 
letter, Dr. Nielsen, is that the letter means just what it says: 
that plaintiff could be given complete relief by just a standard 
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saphenous phlebectomy if there were no obstruction. If there 
were an obstruction, a more extensive surgery would become necessary. 
(R.375) That is, if there was only a problem with the surface 
system, only the surface system would need surgery. If there was 
also a problem with the deep system, then something in addition, 
such as ligating the communicating veins, would also be necessary. 
(R.385) 
Fortunately, the PRG report showed that the obstruction 
was very minor and that there was no problem with the valves and 
that, therefore, more extensive surgery would not be necessary. 
It was never intended that the surgery would not be performed if 
the PRG showed a problem with the deep system, only that a more 
extensive surgery in addition to the standard varicose vein 
surgery would be necessary. (R.385, 424) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff failed to establish a medical negligence 
case, since she produced no competent evidence of the standard of 
care, its breach, or that any breach proximately caused her alleged 
injuries. She also failed to establish an informed consent case, 
since she neglgected to prove that any risk which may have been 
undisclosed to her was a "substantial and significant" risk of 
the surgery. Nor did she establish a cause of action under any 
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other theory of relief, including breach of warranty or concealment 
of material information by Dr. Nielsen. 
Even had plaintiff established a cause of action, her 
claim is necessarily barred by the four-year medical malpractice 
statute of repose. Finally, there was no other reversible error 
committed by the trial court, either in denying plaintiff's 
pretrial motion to amend, in limiting the cross-examination of 
Dr. Nielsen, or in refusing to allow plaintiff's father, an 
electrical engineer, to testify as an expert witness against Dr. 
Nielsen. 
ARGDMENT 
I. 
NO MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASE WAS ESTABLISHED 
A* Elements of the prima facie case. 
The elements of a prima facie medical negligence case 
are three: first, the medical standard of care must be established; 
second, the defendant must be shown to have breached that standard 
of care; third, that the breach must be shown to have proximately 
caused an injury to the plaintiff. Schmidt v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 99,101 (Utah 1981); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 
612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980). Plaintiff established none of 
these elements. 
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B. There was no evidence of the standard of care nor 
of its breach. 
1. The standard and its breach must be established 
through expert testimony. 
The standard of care and its breach must ordinarily be 
established by expert medical testimony. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 
P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982); Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 
P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979). Although declining to do so at trial 
(R.544), plaintiff now contends that the propriety of the treatment 
she received is within the common knowledge and experience of laymen: 
"Laymen understand that you do not remove a functional surface 
vein system in a leg when the only other principal inner vein 
system for blood removal is obstructed." (Appellant's Brief at 15-16) 
This Court has recognized the "common knowledge" exception 
to the requirement of expert medical testimony. See, for example, 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra (surgical needle left in operative 
site); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (drill bit 
dropped down patient's throat); and Talbot v. Dr. W. G. Groves 
Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 
(1968). However, a required foundational element for the use of 
the doctrine is that the injury is, to common knowledge, of a 
kind which in the ordinary course of events would not have happened 
absent negligence. Nixdorf v. Hicken at 352-3; Ballow v. Monroe, 
699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985). In a medical case, this means that 
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the outcome must so affront general concepts of medical propriety 
that no expert is needed, Nixdorf v. Hicken at 353. 
The complexities of the issues are evident upon the briefest 
scanning of Dr. Nielsen's testimony. Further, the only medical 
evidence is that Dr. Nielsen removed an incompetent surface vein 
and left a competent deep vein, (See, for example, R.388-389), and 
that minor obstruction of the deep vein was not a contraindication 
to surgery on the surface vein. (R.385) The complexities of 
vascular surgery do not readily admit to oversimplification by 
untrained laypersons, as the continuing efforts of Dr. Nielsen to 
make himself understood to plaintiff's counsel demonstrate. 
(See, R.388-393, 396-397, 419-424) 
2. No expert testimony was produced by plaintiff. 
Although plaintiff attempted to qualify her father, an 
electrical engineer, as an expert witness to testify against Dr. 
Nielsen (See, V(C), below), she produced no medical witness to 
support either her negligence or causation allegations. Recognizing 
this, she contends that adverse testimony from Dr. Nielsen in 
accordance with Jennings v. Stoker, supra, established the standard 
of care, its breach, and causation. (Appellant's Brief at 16-17) 
However, plaintiff points to no specific evidence in the record 
wherein the standard of care, its breach, or causation was 
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established. Indeed, the only medical evidence on record from 
Dr. Nielsen was that the surgery was appropriate. 
C. There was no evidence that any breach of the 
standard of care proximately caused plaintiff's 
injuries* 
Medical causation is a complex area generally requiring 
expert testimony to establish that a plaintiff's injuries were 
proximately caused by the health care in question. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 
supra, at 354, n.17 (expert proof on causation required even in res 
ipsa loquitur cases); Penney v. St. Mark's Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 
189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968) and see, Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 
P. 2d 828, 834 (res ipsa foundation does not relieve plaintiff 
of burden of proving causation). 
No expert testimony established that plaintiff's alleged 
injuries were due to the surgery performed by defendant. In 
fact, the only competent medical evidence was Dr. Nielsen's 
testimony, which established that plaintiff was better off after 
the surgery because she had been relieved of the potential risks 
of an untreated incompetent vein. He also testified that her 
alleged postoperative injuries might have occurred regardless of 
the surgery. (R.428-429) Her claimed problems could not be assumed 
to have been caused by the surgery. (R.397, 405) There was no 
contradictory evidence from any other witness. 
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II. 
NO INFORMED CONSENT CASE WAS ESTABLISHED 
A. Elements of the prima facie case. 
The elements of an informed consent case are statutory 
and governed by § 78-14-5. They are: 
1. That a provider-patient relationship existed; 
2. That the provider rendered health care to the 
plaintiff; 
3. That the plaintiff suffered personal injuries 
arising out of the health care rendered; 
4. That the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the plaintiff serious 
harm; 
5. That the plaintiff was not, in fact, informed of 
the substantial and significant risk; 
6. That a reasonable person in plaintiff's position 
would not have consented to the surgery if told of the risk; and 
7. That the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff; that 
is, that the substantial and significant risk actually occurred. 
To make out a prima facie informed consent case, plaintiff 
must prove all of the statutory elements. Burton v. Youngblood, 
711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985). That proof is lacking. 
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B. The prima facie elements were not established. 
Consideration of the prima facie elements of an informed 
consent case in view of the evidence presented by plaintiff 
demonstrates the deficiencies in her proof. 
Elements 1 (provider relationship) and 2 (health care 
rendered) were undisputed and established. Element 3 (proximate 
causation of injuries) was not established by any competent 
medical evidence. (See, 1(C), above) No expert testimony established 
that plaintiff's alleged injuries were due to the surgery performed 
by Dr. Nielsen. (R.428-429) Failure to prove causation in an 
informed consent case is fatal. Burton v. Youngblood, Id. 
There was no evidence to establish Element 4; that is, 
what were the "substantial and significant" risks of "serious harm" 
from the varicose vein procedure. Although expert testimony 
is not necessary to establish whether a doctor should have disclosed 
a material risk, expert testimony is required to establish what 
those material risks might be. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772, 791-92 (D. C. Cir. 1972) ("Experts are ordinarily indispensable 
to identify and elucidate . . . the risks of therapy . . . . " ) ; 
Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hospital, 387 A.2d 689, 692 (R.I. 1978); 
Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 563 (D. C. Cir. 1982) ("Although 
expert testimony is not needed to establish the scope of or the breach 
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of the duty to inform one's patients before treating them, we 
note that expert testimony is necessary to establish the nature 
and degree of the risks of the proposed and alternate treatments, 
the probability of therapeutic success, and whether disclosure 
would be detrimental to a particular patient."); Sard v. Hardy, 
379 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Md. 1977) ("We are not to be understood as 
holding, however, that expert medical testimony can be dispensed 
with entirely in cases of informed consent. Such expert testimony 
would be required to establish the nature of the risks inherent 
in a particular treatment . . . .") ; and Getchell v. Mansfield, 
489 P.2d 953, 956 (Ore. 1971). See, also, Seidelson, Medical 
Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclosure" 
Jurisdictions, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 309 (1976) (wherein the author 
notes that generally only a duly-qualified expert medical witness 
can identify material risks and that the "full disclosure" rule 
does not eliminate the need for expert medical testimony.) 
The only testimony — expert or otherwise -- in this 
record on any substantial and significant risk in Dr. Nielsen's 
surgery was the testimony of Dr. Nielsen, who stated that the 
only "major risk" of the surgery was blood clotting (thrombosis) 
in the deep vein system. (R.383-4) No witness identified the 
postoperative problems plaintiff alleges she suffered to be a known 
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risk of the procedure, let alone a "substantial and significant" 
risk of it. Without such testimony, it is inappropriate to assume 
that plaintiff's problems were a substantial and significant 
risk of the surgery. Plaintiff presented no evidence of the 
materiality of any risk other than the risk of deep vein blood 
clots, which risk did not occur. 
Element 5 (plaintiff not informed of a risk) was the 
subject of disputed evidence, but plaintiff did make a sufficient 
showing by testifying that she was not informed of any risks 
preoperatively. However, that alone is insufficient unless 
competent testimony establishes that she was not informed of a 
substantial and significant risk. Similarly, Element 6 (that a 
reasonable person would not have consented) was sufficiently 
established, if we assume that plaintiff established an undisclosed 
and material risk. 
Finally, Element 7 (that the unauthorized health care 
caused the plaintiff's injury) is essentially the same as Element 
3. Suffice it to say that even if there were evidence that 
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the surgery, there was no 
evidence that those injuries were the result of an undisclosed 
substantial and significant risk of the surgery. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED NO PRIMA FACIE CASE 
UNDER ANY OTHER THEORY OF RELIEF 
A. No "written guarantee" was established. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act restricts breach 
of contract and breach of warranty claims against physicians. It 
provides in § 78-14-6 that: 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health 
care provider on the basis of an alleged 
breach of guaranty, warranty, contract or 
assurance of results to be obtained from any 
health care rendered unless the guaranty, 
warranty, contract or assurance is set forth 
in writing and signed by the health care 
provider or an authorized agent of the provider. 
Plaintiff relies on the September 14, 1979, letter from 
Dr. Nielsen to Dr. Daines to establish a written warranty in 
accordance with the statutory requirement. As previously discussed, 
plaintiff contends that this letter warrants that Dr. Nielsen 
would not perform the saphenous vein removal unless the deep 
system was normal. However, Dr. Nielsen testified that the 
letter he wrote means what it says: that the saphenous surgery 
alone would be performed if the deep system was normal. If not, 
it implies, something further would be required. There is no 
"warranty" to plaintiff that no surgery would be performed if the 
deep vein system was inadequate. 
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Plaintiff's "Second of Cause of Action" in her Complaint 
originally alleged that defendant "assured" and "guaranteed" her 
that there were no risks associated with the contemplated surgery 
and that, relying on these assurances and guarantees, she consented 
to undergo the surgery. (R.2) In his Answer to the Complaint, 
defendant raised § 78-14-6 as an affirmative defense. (R.7) 
Defendant served requests for admissions on plaintiff in accordance 
with Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requests were 
duly answered on June 29, 1984. (R.18) In her responses to 
defendant's requests for admissions, plaintiff admitted that the 
alleged assurances, representations, and guarantees were not set 
forth in any writing. (R.18) Accordingly, defendant moved for 
partial summary judgment in view of these admissions and the 
requirements of § 78-14-6. (R.20) After a hearing at which 
counsel for plaintiff did not appear, Judge Frederick entered 
partial summary judgment for defendant, dismissing the Second 
Cause of Action with prejudice. (R.36) Plaintiff, two weeks 
before trial on the merits, moved to set aside the partial summary 
judgment and to amend the Complaint to allege a written warranty, 
based on her "discovery" of the September 14, 1979 letter at the 
trial on the statute of limitations. (R.83, 92, 94) The court 
denied the motion to amend on the grounds that it was not made 
with due diligence and that, as a matter of law, the September 
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14, 1979 letter did not set forth a written warranty in accordance 
with the statute. 
Plaintiff never moved to set aside her admission that 
the warranty she alleged was not set forth in any writing. Rule 
36(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Any matter admitted under this rule is 
conclusively established unless the court on 
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission. . . [T] he court may permit withdrawal 
or amendment when the presentation of the 
merits will be subserved thereby and the 
party who obtains the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment 
will prejudice him in maintaining his action 
on defense on the merits . . . ." 
No such motion to withdraw or amend her admission was 
ever made by plaintiff, despite counsel for defendant's indication 
that this would be necessary. (R.354 and see, further, R.77-98 
and R.348-353) 
This Court has consistently held that Rule 36(b) means 
that matters deemed admitted are conclusively established unless 
the trial court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admissions. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 
100 (Utah 1985); Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1985); Schmidt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1979); W. W. 
& W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 
736 (Utah 1977). 
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Mere filing of a motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside a 
judgment based upon admissions does not in itself set aside the 
admissions: "Those matters are covered exclusively by a motion 
made as provided by Rule 36(b)". Whitaker v. Nichols, supra at 
687. As in Whitaker v. Nichols and in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge, 
there is nothing in this record to indicate that plaintiff moved 
to amend or withdraw her admissions. Therefore, the lack of a 
written warranty as required by § 78-14-6 was conclusively established 
under Rule 36(b) and was properly treated as such by the trial court. 
B, No "concealment* case was established. 
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Nielsen had a duty to 
disclose to her the results of the PRG, that he did not do so and 
that, in fact, he fraudulently concealed those results. (Appellant's 
Brief at 7-15). Specifically, plaintiff contends that Dr. Nielsen 
fraudulently concealed the results of the PRG by telling her that 
the results were encouraging and by telling Dr. Daines that the 
test showed "dampening of the pulse wave . . . but no luminal 
occlusion." (Appellant's Brief at 11) This, according to plaintiff, 
is obviously false because a "dictionary definition" (which 
dictionary is not specified) shows that "occlusion," "obstruction," 
and "thrombosis" are essentially equivalent terms. (Id.) 
This demonstrates profound ignorance of the medical 
facts. As Dr. Nielsen patiently attempted to explain under 
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cross-examination, an "occlusion" and an "obstruction" are not 
synonomous. An obstruction is any interference with flow, however 
minor, while an occlusion is a far more serious condition resulting 
in a cessation of flow. (R.372, 423) On the other hand, "thrombosis" 
is a different process producing blood clots, having nothing to 
do with an occlusion or obstruction of the flow in the vessel, 
(See, R.383-384) To say that an occlusion, an obstruction, and a 
thrombosis are synonyms demonstrates the pitfalls of non-learned 
forays into a complex and learned field. There was never any 
evidence of an occlusion. A minor obstructive situation, posing 
no real threat to plaintiff, was diagnosed. And, fortunately, 
she never developed deep vein thrombosis. 
In Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, this court recognized the 
fiduciary duty of a doctor to inform his patient of any material 
information concerning the patient's physical condition. The 
Court held that it was a matter of common knowledge that surgical 
needles are not left in a patient's body absent negligence and 
that this was obviously a material piece of information which the 
doctor should have disclosed to his patient. 
That decision arose in the context of a postoperative 
choice by the defendant doctor not to disclose an obviously 
material piece of information to his patient. This case is 
not analogous. Plaintiff confuses the Nixdorf elements with informed 
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consent. In substance, her claim is that the PRG report contained 
material information indicating an increased risk from the proposed 
surgery and that, had she known of this risk, she would not have 
undergone the procedure. Having been unable to prove the statutory 
elements of an informed consent case, she nevertheless attempts 
to construct a theory of relief under the Nixdorf doctrine. 
The materiality of the withheld information in Nixdorf 
was obvious to the appellate court. This plaintiff assumes that 
any information "withheld" from a plaintiff must be material. 
There was no doubt in Nixdorf that a reasonable person in the 
position of plaintiff would have considered the information 
important in choosing a course of treatment. However, in this 
case, it is clear that plaintiff has little understanding of the 
PRG report and can hardly claim it to be material. The essence 
of her argument is that the results of any preoperative diagnostic 
test must be disclosed verbatim to a patient in order that that 
patient, lacking any medical knowledge, can consider whether or 
not the information is material, although the plaintiff may not 
comprehend the information at all. The only medical evidence was 
that the PRG report contained encouraging news and that nothing 
in it contraindicated the proposed surgery. Plaintiff certainly 
has the right to disclosure of material information; however, she 
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has no right to make uninformed speculations as to what specialized 
tests mean and expect a physician to be bound by her determinations. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED IN ANY EVENT 
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF REPOSE 
Section 78-14-4 provides the statute of limitations and 
of repose for medical malpractice actions: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence 
. • . (our emphasis) 
This action was commenced with the filing of the Complaint 
on May 4, 1984. (R.2) The date of the surgery in issue was 
September 19, 1979. This Court has previously recognized the 
"continuing negligence" doctrine, in Petelar v. Robison, 81 Utah 
535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932), although the case was decided well 
before the medical malpractice repose statute was enacted in 
1976. That doctrine postulates that if continuing acts of negligence 
of a similar character together lead to the injuries alleged, the 
plaintiff should not be required to split a cause of action so 
that those acts outside the repose period are barred, while those 
within the repose period are not. 
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It should be distinguished from two related doctrines, 
the "continuing treatment doctrine", which holds that an action 
accrues on the date of the last treatment, negligent or not, and 
the "termination of relationship doctrine" which holds that an 
action accrues on the termination of the physician-patient 
relationship, whether or not treatment had continued. Utah has 
never recognized either of those related doctrines, and it is 
doubtful that this Court would do so now in view of the express 
language of the repose statute that an action accrues upon the 
date of the negligent act or omission. 
However, where the continuing negligence doctrine 
is applied, a defendant is entitled to prove that there was, in 
fact, no "negligent act" within the repose period. For purposes 
of the limitations issue the date of the last "negligent" conduct 
by defendant is critical. For example, if Dr. Nielsen had been 
negligent in the surgery, and not negligent thereafter, this 
action would be barred, since any negligent act would necessarily 
be outside the four-year repose period. See, Tamminnen v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 327 N.W.2d 55, 66 (Wis. 1978). If plaintiff 
failed to produce evidence that there was a negligent act or 
omission after January 4, 1980, that is, within the four-year 
repose period (plus the additional 90 days granted by service of 
a notice of intent under § 78-14-8) her action must fail, even if 
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there was sufficient evidence of negligence at any time before 
that date. 
As noted, plaintiff failed to produce any competent 
evidence of any act of negligence, either before or after January 
4, 1980. Necessarily, therefore, defendant established his 
affirmative defense that the action was barred by the applicable 
statute of repose since no negligent act was shown to have occurred 
within four years of the date of the commencement of the action. 
V. 
THERE WAS NO OTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR 
COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL CODRT 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court committed reversible 
error (a) in denying her motion to amend her Complaint to add 
causes of action for breach of warranty and intentional concealment, 
(b) in restricting cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen; and (c) in 
refusing to allow her father to testify as an expert witness. 
None of these contentions has any merit. 
A. The motion to amend. 
On February 5, 1985, defendant certified this matter as 
ready for trial. (R.39) No objection was filed by plaintiff. 
On February 28, 1985, this matter was set for jury trial on the 
merits for April 9, 1985. (R.44) This date was later continued 
at the request of counsel for defendant until April 16, 1985. 
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(R.45, 47) On April 2, 1984, following the non-jury trial on the 
limitations issue, plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint to 
allege the existence of a written guarantee in accordance with 
§ 78-14-6 and to allege an actionable concealment on the part of 
Dr. Nielsen. (R.92, 83) At the same time, plaintiff moved for 
relief from the partial summary judgment entered on the written 
guarantee issue. (R.94, 87) Finally, plaintiff moved to continue 
the scheduled trial date or, in the alternative, for a Rule 54(b) 
certification on the statute of limitations question. (R.87, 77) 
The motions were heard on the morning of the first day 
of trial on the merits, April 16, 1984. (R.346) All of plaintiff's 
motions were denied by the trial court. (R.356-358) The motion 
to amend to allege a written guarantee was denied on the grounds 
of lack of due diligence and investigation by plaintiff's counsel 
and that in any event, the September 14, 1979 letter could not be 
construed as a written guarantee. The motion to amend to allege 
an actionable concealment was denied for similar reasons. 
Plaintiff never took the deposition of defendant or of 
any other witness. Plaintiff never requested copies of Dr. 
Nielsen's medical records, which contained the documents she now 
contends show an intentional concealment and a written warranty. 
No Interrogatories under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
were ever served by plaintiff. No requests for admission of 
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facts were ever served by plaintiff. In short, plaintiff did no 
discovery of any kind prior to trial. 
Motions to amend pleadings are, of course, liberally 
granted under Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and every 
final judgment should grant all relief to which a party is entitled, 
even if not demanded in the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc. , 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983). However, a 
motion to amend remains within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984), 
Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 
1983). Where plaintiff failed to engage in any discovery of any 
kind, denial of the motion to amend can hardly be construed to 
constitute an abuse of discretion, especially since every document 
which plaintiff contends is significant was readily discoverable 
to her, had she wished to do so. 
More significantly, the denial of plaintiff's motions 
is, in fact, immaterial since plaintiff presented all the evidence 
she wanted to present under the "concealment" and "warranty" 
theories at trial. She was even allowed to make arguments on 
those issues in response to the motion for directed verdict. The 
directed verdict subsumed the new theories of relief and indicated 
that plaintiff presented no prima facie case under those or any 
other theories. Thus, even if the denial of the motion to amend 
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was erroneous, no harm resulted from it since no evidence was excluded 
based upon it, and no reversible error can be premised upon it. 
See, Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Loader v. Scott 
Construction Co., 681 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Utah 1984). 
B* Cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen, 
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court committed reversible 
error in not allowing a complete cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen 
on the issue of the PRG report: "The judge's sustaining spurious 
objections to 'incriminating' questions on this key issue was not 
only reversible error but may reflect the judge's reluctance to 
preside over a trial involving evidence of aggrevated (sic) 
misconduct of a member of the esteemed medical profession." 
(Appellant's Brief at 21) 
The testimony in question is as follows: 
Q. (BY MR. DAINES) Dr. Nielsen, I think you said that 
you told Becky Chadwick that the results of the 
phleborheogram were basically good; is that right? 
A. (BY DR. NIELSEN) Compared to what might have been, 
yes. 
Q. (BY MR. DAINES) Do you think that you had an obligation 
to tell her that while you thought they were good, that 
Dr. Ford, Dr. Swensen, and the technician, however, 
were of the opinion that her deep system was chronically 
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obstructed and that those were the results of the test 
and the report from their point of view, whether you thought 
they were good or not? 
MR. HANSON: Objection. That's based upon facts not in 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, that's a good and fair 
representation of what the phleborheogram report says. 
THE COURT: Well Mr. Daines, it may be fairly representative 
of what the report says, but it is not representative of 
what the doctors felt that the effect or interpretation 
of the report was." (R.398-399) 
The objections were not "spurious" nor the questions 
"incriminating." As the court noted, there was no evidence on what 
Dr. Ford, Dr. Swensen and the PRG technician thought of the PRG 
report. In fact, the PRG report itself merely "suggests" a 
chronic obstructive situation and says nothing about the deep 
system. The sustaining of this objection was entirely appropriate, 
since the question contained misrepresentations of facts and 
assumptions of facts not in evidence. 
C. Mr, Chadwick as an expert witness. 
Plaintiff attempted to qualify her father, Mr. Duane G. 
Chadwick, as an expert witness, apparently to establish the 
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standard of care or causation of plaintiffs injuries. (R.481-497) 
Mr. Chadwick is an electrical engineer and a professor of engineering 
at Utah State University and, in plaintiff's view, was qualified 
to testify as an expert witness on the significance of the 
phleborheogram report because of his expertise in water flow 
mechanics. (R.524-525) Defendant objected to any expert testimony 
from this witness on the ground that he was not qualified under 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. (R.523-525) 
Voir dire in aid of defendant's objection established 
that Mr. Chadwick was not a medical doctor, had never measured 
"flow parameters11 on the human body, had never studied medicine, 
had never performed surgery, had never studied the human vascular 
system, had never performed a phleborheogram, and had never 
interpreted a phleborheogram. (R.523-525) The trial court there-
upon sustained defendant's objection. (R.525 and R.531-536) Mr. 
Chadwick was not allowed to express any expert opinions. 
Burton v. Youngblood, supra, recognized the general 
rule that a practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent 
to testify as an expert in a medical malpractice action against a 
practitioner of another school unless a foundation is laid that 
the same standards govern both specialities. 711 P.2d at 248. 
Implicit in this ruling is the recognition that an electrical 
engineer is even less competent to testify against a medical 
- 32 -
specialist. Nothing precludes consideration of expert testimony 
from an individual in a trade different than that in issue when 
the standard of care is identical for both. The critical fact in 
determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert 
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the 
issues before it. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 
250, 253 (Utah 1985). Foundational to that determination is a 
showing that the proffered witness is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to express an 
opinion on the subject at issue. See, generally, J. B. Weinstein 
and M. A. Berger, Weinstein1s Evidence, Par. 702 [01]-[04] (1985). 
Mr. Chadwick, an electrical engineer, readily admitted 
that he had no knowledge of vascular surgery or of medicine in 
general. Lack of a medical degree may not in itself be an automatic 
disqualification. See, for example, Jenkins v. United States, 
307 F.2d 637 (D. C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (A pre-Rule 702 case 
considering the qualifications of non-M. D. psychologists to 
render opinions on "mental diseases or defects" in criminal 
cases.) However, at a minimum, an expert in a medical malpractice 
case should be required to demonstrate some familiarity with medical 
principles and with the applicable standard of care. This witness 
denied any such knowledge. 
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The determination of whether a proffered witness is 
competent to testify as an expert is within the discretion of the 
trial court. Wessel, supra at 253; Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
clearly in error. Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983); Shurtleff v. J. Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1980); and Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 
547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th Cir. 1977). No such clear error exists 
here. 
Finally, it should be noted that Rule 103(a), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, provides that: "Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence . . . unless . . . 
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by 
offer or was apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked." A party's failure to make an offer of proof as to 
excluded evidence precludes him from asserting on appeal that the 
exclusion of his evidence was in error. Downey State Bank v. 
Major Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978); Dansak v. 
Deluxe, 12 Utah 2d 302, 366 P.d 67 (1961) and cases cited therein; 
and see, Andrews v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 334 F.2d 422, 
424 (8th Cir. 1964) (Exclusion of witness at medical malpractice 
trial.) 
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An offer of proof must be certain, sufficient, and 
intelligible and must definitely show the facts sought to be 
proved. It must show the materiality, competency, and relevance 
of the evidence offered. Dansak v. Deluxe, supra, 12 Utah 2d at 
306; 366 P.2d at 70. Plaintiff never made any offer of proof 
as to what Mr. Chadwick would testify, let alone a sufficient 
offer of proof under the rules of evidence. Plaintiff did "offer 
to prove" that a non-medical expert in fluid flows is as qualified 
as a medical expert in blood flows, but left it at that. (R.492-493) 
This is no mere technicality. Reversible error is not to be 
presumed, but must be shown on the record. Olin Mathieson, 
supra, 334 F.2d at 428. The function of the offer of proof is to 
inform the court what the excluded evidence would have proved and 
ensures that the record will be sufficiently detailed to permit 
appraisal by an appellate court of the effect of the ruling so 
that it can determine whether the court committed reversible 
error. Weinstein, supra, Par. 103[03]. 
There is nothing in this record to tell us what Mr. 
Chadwick would have testified to had he been permitted to testify. 
We cannot know whether he would have testified that Dr. Nielsen's 
surgery was negligent, or whether the phleborheogram showed a 
contraindication to the surgery, or whether the surgery caused 
plaintiff's postoperative disability. Since there is no evidence 
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to show that the excluded evidence would have been material and 
significant, there is no basis to premise reversible error on its 
exclusion. See, Yost v. A. 0. Smith, Corp.
 f 562 F.2d 592, 595 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, defendant, Talmage Nielsen, M. D., 
respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court entering 
a directed verdict in his favor should be affirmed. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 1986. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Stewart M. Hanson,*<rr ., Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
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